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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

LINDA KAY CLARK,
Petitioner/Appellant,

CASE NO. 971635 - CA

vs .
CECIL E. CLARK,
Respondent/Appellee.

Appellee, CECIL CLARK, hereinafter "Mr. Clark" or
"Respondent", submits the following Brief:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
Rules 3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and §7 82a-3(2) (h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's
(hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Ms. Clark") motions for a
pro

tunc

nunc

order, to supplement the findings and decree, and

her objections to the order vacating the decree?
A trial court's determination that it lacked subject

1

matter jurisdiction is reviewed on appeal for correction of
error.

Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997)

(citing Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah
1993)).
2.

If the trial court erred by determining that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was the trial court
within its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for
nunc

pro

tunc

order?

Trial courts enjoy "broad discretion" in deciding
whether or not to enter an order nunc pro

tunc.

H o m e v.

H o m e , 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987).
3.

If the trial court erred by determining that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was the trial court
within its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to
supplement the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
decree of divorce and objection to the order vacating the
decree and order of dismissal?
Generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion
in divorce matters.

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818

(Utah App. 1992)
4.

Is the one year requirement of §30-1-4.5 of the

Utah Code Ann. constitutional?

2

"The challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness/'

Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1262

(Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Respondent submits that there are no statutory nor
constitutional provisions completely determinative of the
issues presented herein.
UTAH CODE ANN.

However §30-1-4.5 and §30-4a-l

and Art. VIII, §5, Art. I, §2 4, and Art. I, §11

of the UTAH CONSTITUTION are relevant to this appeal.

§30-1-

4.5, §30-4a-l, and Art. I, §§11 and 24 are included in
Appellant's Addendum, and Art. VIII, §5 is attached hereto
as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third

Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
The trial court entered a Declaration of Marriage and
Decree of Divorce on September 29, 1997.

(R. 278-282).

Respondent appealed this order, case # 970635-CA.

The

After

this Declaration and Decree, Respondent moved to dismiss the
3

action in the trial court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

The trial court granted Respondent's motion

On September 3, 1998.

(R. 504-507).

Petitioner moved for a

stay, to supplement the findings, and objected to the trial
court's order of dismissal.

(R. 508-539).

The trial court

granted Petitioner's motion for stay and denied Petitioner's
remaining motion and objection on December 24, 1998.
566-68).

(R.

Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal of this

order on January 19, 1999. (R. 569).
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent submits the following factual summary and
hereby incorporates his Statement of the Facts as set forth
in his Appellate Brief filed in the companion appeal to this
case, case # 970635-CA.
The parties were previously married.

This marriage

ended in divorce on August 27, 1985.

After this divorce,

the parties resumed living together.

This subsequent

relationship was found by the court below to have ended on
August 28, 1996.

(R. 267, Aplt. Add. 1 ) . Petitioner filed

her Complaint for Divorce on October 1, 1996.

(R. 1, Aplt.

Add. 2 ) .
As the parties and the trial court were very aware of

4

the one year time requirement under § 30-1-4,5,1 trial was
expedited in this matter, and held on August 13, 1997.

(R.

267, Aplt. Add. 1 ) . Judge Frederick entered specific
findings from the bench on the same day as trial.

(Aplt.

Brf. p. 6, Aplt. Add. 3 ) . The trial court also entered a
lengthy minute entry on August 13, 1997, the same day as
trial.

(R. 238). All of this happened fifteen days prior

to the one year limit of August 28, 1997.
Petitioner failed even to submit her Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage until
September 26, 1997.

(Aplt. Brf. p. 6 ) . The trial court

promptly signed these documents on September 29, 1997.
(Aplt. Brf. p. 6 ) .
Respondent filed an appeal in this Court on October 28,
1997, which is currently pending in case # 970635-CA.

This

appeal was consolidated into the present appeal as case #
971635-CA, by order of this Court on February 24, 1999.
Respondent filed his Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on May 4, 1998.

1

(R.

On July 1, 1997, Commissioner Jones entered a minute
entry stating that "the statutory limit on establishment of
a marriage is looming."
(R. 223). On July 16, 1997, the
trial court set the matter for trial scheduled for August
13, 1997. (R. 224).
5

419).

Petitioner filed her response to the motion to

dismiss and her motion to enter order nunc
3, 1998.

(R. 445-449, 453-54).

pro

tunc

on June

Both motions came on for

hearing before the trial court on August 31, 1998.

(R. 581,

Aplt. Add. 6 ) . The trial court granted Respondent's motion
to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for a nunc
tunc

order.

(R. 540-506).

pro

The trial court specifically

acknowledged:
It is my recollection that all [parties]
recognized [the] severity, the potential severity,
of the imposed deadlines in this statutory scheme,
and we did, indeed, move the matter along
expeditiously to have the matter tried within the
one-year time frame. And it was accomplished.
(Transcript from hearing on motion to dismiss,- R.
581, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 13).
On September 10, 1998, Petitioner filed her motion for
stay and to supplement findings of fact and conclusions of
law and decree of divorce.

(R. 508). On December 24, 1998,

the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner's
motion for stay and denying the motion to supplement the
findings.

(R. 566-68).

Petitioner filed her notice of

appeal on January 19, 1999. (R 569-575).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
§30-1-4.5 clearly and unambiguously requires that a
6

common law marriage be established by order of the court
within one year after the termination of the relationship.
Here, it is undisputed that an order establishing a common
law marriage between the parties was not entered within one
year of the termination of the relationship, and that it
could easily have been entered.

Therefore, under the clear

and unambiguous language of §30-1-4.5, the trial court
correctly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction upon Respondent's motion.
Because the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction in this matter, after August 27, 1997, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Petitioner's motions to supplement the findings and decree,
for nunc

pro

tunc

order, and objection to motion to dismiss.

In fact the trial court had no jurisdiction even to
entertain Petitioner's motions.
Assuming that this Court finds that the trial court did
have subject matter jurisdiction over this action after one
year beyond the termination of the relationship, the trial
court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the
Petitioner's motions.

The parties and the trial court acted

as expeditiously as possible to ensure that the trial would

7

be held prior to the deadline.

The trial court ruled from

the bench and entered a lengthy minute entry on the same day
as trial to assist the Petitioner in timely drafting the
final documents.

Petitioner had fifteen days from the date

of trial to submit the documents to the court.

The

documents were not submitted until nearly six weeks after
trial.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for nunc

pro

tunc

order.
Assuming that the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner's motion to supplement
the findings and decree, the trial court did not abuse its
broad discretion in denying this motion.

The Petitioner

failed adequately to plead any of the alternate theories
which may have originally been available to her.

None of

the elements of any alternate theories were even alleged in
the pleadings, or at the full and complete trial in this
matter.

Therefore, the trial court was within its

discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to supplement the
findings and decree and objection to motion to dismiss.
Finally, Petitioner's claims that §30-1-4.5 is
unconstitutional are without merit.

8

First, Petitioner

failed to adequately raise any constitutional issues at the
trial level.

Second, Petitioner was not denied access to

the judicial system.
issues she raised.

She received a full trial on all the
She won at trial.

Petitioner was

neither denied due process nor her right to equal
protection.

She was treated just as every other party to a

common law action.

Neither the Respondent, nor the trial

court, nor the statute had any control over the Petitioner's
failure timely to submit the requisite documents.

The

Petitioner received every protection that all common law
litigants receive.

Petitioner's own failure to take the

reasonable steps to secure her remedy required the trial
court to dismiss the action.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE ACTION FOR LACK
OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
"The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original

and appellate, shall be provided by statute."
UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Art. VIII, §5

The statute in question in this case is

§30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Ann., which requires that "[t]he
determination or establishment of a marriage under this
section must occur during the relationship described in
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination
9

of that relationship/'
mandatory language.

(emphasis added).

This is clear

There is no room for the trial court to

abuse its discretion as Petitioner has argued.

"^When

interpreting statutes, this court is guided by the longstanding rule that a statute should be construed according
to its plain language.'"

Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,

920 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't
of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995)).

"Thus, when the

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we will not
look beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent/'

Id.

(citing Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1989)).

Therefore, the trial court has subject matter

jurisdiction, pursuant to §30-1-4.5, to enter an order
establishing a common law marriage during the relationship,
or within one year following the termination of said
relationship, after this one-year period, the trial court
loses subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court found that the parties' relationship
terminated on August 28, 1996.

(R. 551). Mr. Clark

disputes this in his related appeal, but for purposes of Ms.
Clark's appeal, this is irrelevant.

It is undisputed that

the trial court specifically expedited this case to ensure

10

compliance with the one-year time limit in §30-1-4.5.

Trial

was held on August 13, 1997, well within the one-year
requirement.

The trial court ruled from the bench and

entered a lengthy minute entry on August 13, 1997.
39) .

(R. 238-

Petitioner had ample opportunity to generate and

submit findings of fact and conclusions of law and a final
order between August 13 and August 28, 1997.
It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to submit the
requisite findings or final order to the trial court until
approximately September 26, 1997.

(Aplt. Brf. p. 6 ) . This

was approximately six weeks after the trial, and nearly four
weeks after the one year time limit imposed by §30-1-4.5.
These documents were promptly signed by the trial court
three days later on September 29, 1997.
The Bunch case cited above, while not directly on
point, does provide guidance in this case.

In Bunch, Ms.

Bunch sought to establish a common law marriage to Mr.
Englehorn.

Id. at 919.

Mr. Englehorn moved to dismiss the

action because there had been no court order entered
establishing a common law marriage within one year after the
relationship had ended.

Id.

The same as the Petitioner

here, Bunch admittedly failed to obtain an order from the

11

court establishing a common law marriage within one year of
the termination of the relationship.

Id. at 920.

The trial

court concluded that, based on the requirements of §30-14.5, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action
and dismissed the case.

Id. at 919.

On appeal, Bunch argued that, because she filed her
complaint within one year of termination of the
relationship, she complied with §30-1-4.5.

Id. at 920-21.

This Court determined that this interpretation was contrary
to the plain meaning of §30-1-4.5.

Id. at 921.

"Under the

plain meaning of the statute, Bunch did not obtain a timely
determination of her relationship with Englehorn."

Id.

This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case
based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. at

921.
This holding directly applies to the facts of the
present case.

Petitioner admittedly failed to obtain an

order from the court establishing a common law marriage
within one year of the termination of the relationship.
Under the plain meaning of §30-1-4.5, Petitioner did not
obtain a timely order establishing a common law marriage
with Respondent, and therefore the trial court correctly

12

dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE, AND OBJECTION TO THE ORDER VACATING THE DECREE
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL.
As the trial court correctly determined that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the clear
and unambiguous language of §30-1-4.5, the trial court
correctly denied Petitioner's motions filed subsequent to
losing said jurisdiction.

See Bunch, 906 P.2d at 921.

Petitioner's arguments alleging that the trial court erred
by denying Petitioner's motions after the dismissal are
without merit.
Once the action was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Petitioner's only recourse lay with the
appellate courts.

Without subject matter jurisdiction, the

trial court's only available course of action was to dismiss
the case.

See Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335 (Utah 1997)

(affirming the trial court's dismissal of action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846
P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (stating that a judge, acting in
his/her judicial capacity, loses immunity from suit if the

13

judge acts without subject matter jurisdiction); Bankler v.
Bankler, 963 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1998)(affirming the trial
court's dismissal of action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
Petitioner argues that the trial court "erred in not
granting [her] nunc

pro

tunc

motion" because the statute

"requires only a finding of good

cause

. . . ."

(Aplt. Brf.

P. 11). However, this argument neglects the trial court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Petitioner's argument,

if accepted, would allow a trial court lacking subject
matter jurisdiction to enter an order nunc pro

tunc

to

establish subject matter jurisdiction over an action.
would be improper:

This

A court must first have subject matter

jurisdiction to enter an order.

It can not enter an order

to create subject matter jurisdiction.
For example, in the Bankler case cited above, the
parties were divorced in California.

963 P.2d at 798.

The

husband sought to modify the decree in the Fifth District
Court of Utah since he had moved to Utah and the wife had
domesticated the decree in the Fifth District Court of Utah.
Id.

The court dismissed the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, as the California court had

14

specifically retained jurisdiction over the matter.
This Court affirmed the trial court.

Id.

Id. at 801.

Under Petitioner's argument, the Fifth District Court
could have entered an order nunc pro

tunc

establishing

subject matter jurisdiction over the matter prior to the
California order, upon a showing of good cause.

However,

such would contradict the plain and unambiguous language of
the Nunc Pro Tunc Statute which states:
A court having jurisdiction
may, upon its finding
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be
ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or
annulment of marriage. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-4a-l
(1998)(emphasis added).
Therefore, Petitioner has erred in arguing that the "statute
requires only a finding of good

cause/'

Jurisdiction is a

clear prerequisite even to considering a motion for a
pro

tunc

order.

nunc

As the trial court clearly lacked subject

matter jurisdiction, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for entry of a
nunc

pro

tunc

order to establish jurisdiction.

III. IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT LACKED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, THE TRIAL COURT WAS STILL
WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
15

FINDINGS AND DECREE AND OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL.
Trial courts enjoy "broad discretion'" in deciding
whether or not to enter an order nunc pro
H o m e , 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987).

tunc.

H o m e v.

In addition,

generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion in
divorce matters.
App. 1992).

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah

Assuming that the trial court had the subject

matter jurisdiction required to entertain Petitioner's
motion for nunc

pro

tunc

order and other motions, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying said motions.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by not
granting this motion for nunc pro

tunc

order because the

statute only requires a showing of good cause.
language of the statute is not mandatory.

However, the

The statute does

not require that a trial court enter an order nunc pro
under any circumstances.
having jurisdiction may,
enter a order nunc

pro

The statute states that

xv

tunc

[a] court

upon its finding of good cause"
tunc.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-4a-l

(1998).

The language of the statute clearly and unambiguously leaves
the decision to enter the order in the sound discretion of
the court.
In the present action, where the trial court and the

16

Respondent acted expeditiously to assure compliance with the
one-year time requirement of §30-1-4.5, the Petitioner has
failed to establish any good cause for why she failed to
submit the requisite documents to the court until six weeks
after the trial.2

The trial court conducted the trial

leaving ample time for the Petitioner to do so, ruled
promptly from the bench at the end of trial, and entered a
lengthy minute entry on the same day as trial to further
facilitate the Petitioner's ability to submit the requisite
documents.

As the power to submit the documents timely was

solely with the Petitioner, even if the trial court did have
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, the trial
court was within its broad discretion in denying
Petitioner's motion for a nunc pro

tunc

order.

Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in
denying the Petitioner's motion to supplement the findings
and decree.

(Aplt. Brf. p. 13). Petitioner argues that the

trial court should have supplemented the findings "to

2

"It is my recollection that all [parties] recognized
severity, the potential severity, of the imposed deadlines
in this statutory scheme, and we did, indeed, move the
matter along expeditiously to have the matter tried within
the one-year time frame. And it was accomplished."
(Judge
Frederick, Transcript from hearing on motion to dismiss, R.
581, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 13)
17

consider and rule on the alternate theories'' of the case.
(Aplt. Brf. p. 13). This motion was filed after the trial
court had already determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
Petitioner included the following sentence in her
complaint: "These assets should be divided pursuant to
common law principles and alternatively under the theory of
partnership, contract for services or trust/'
2).

(Aplt. Add.

However, none of the elements of these alternative

theories were pled in the complaint.

In addition, none of

these alternative theories were argued to the trial court,
prior to, or during the trial of this matter.

Petitioner

had ample opportunity to amend her complaint to specifically
plead the requisite elements of any alternate theories from
the filing of her complaint in October of 1996, until the
trial in August of 1997.

She had ample opportunity to

submit evidence at trial to support these alternate
theories.

No elements of contract, trust or partnership

were alleged in the complaint or testified to at trial.
Petitioner cites Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177
(Utah App. 1988), for the holding that "equitable theories
of constructive trust or resulting trust doctrines would
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apply/'

(Aplt. Brf. p. 16). However, actually, this Court

in Mattes found that there was no common law marriage and no
constructive trust.

Id. at 1181.

This Court stated that

" [a] constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee was in
a confidential relationship with the grantor/'

Id. at 1179

(citing Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah
1983)).

Petitioner never alleged any confidential

relationship in her pleadings or at trial.
Without any cite to the record to show where the trial
court refused to allow her to submit any evidence at trial,
Petitioner argues that she "has been denied an opportunity
to present evidence and briefing on that theory."
Brf. p. 16).

(Aplt.

Petitioner had ample time to brief any issue

for trial and to submit any evidence at trial.

Petitioner

was never denied an opportunity to produce any evidence
concerning any of her alternative theories.

If she failed

to do so, it must have been a conscious trial decision,
which she only now regrets in hindsight.
Petitioner also relies on Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d
504 (Utah App. 1989), to support her argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying her motion to
supplement the findings and decree under alternate theories.
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In Layton, this Court acknowledged that "an equitable
division of property accumulated by unmarried cohabitants
has been sustained upon finding a partnership, contract for
services, and/or a trust."

Id. at 505-506.

However, this

Court denied Ms. Layton's suggestion of these alternative
theories as they were not adequately pled or sufficiently
pursued at the trial level.

Id. at 506.

In addition,

"[t]here are no findings or conclusions concerning any
grounds for the property award other than a marriageequivalent under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 . . . ."
This is analogous to the present case.

Id.

Petitioner's

pleadings were insufficient to maintain an action under any
alternate theories.

None of the elements of partnership,

contract or trust were even alleged in Petitioner's
complaint.

Further, Petitioner did not submit any evidence

or testimony at trial to support any findings or conclusions
with regard to the elements of these alternate theories.
While it is clear that a trial court may consider these
alternate theories under Utah Law, Petitioner is not
relieved from her obligation to plead allegations sufficient
to support the elements of these alternate theories, nor is
she relieved of her obligation to submit evidence or
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testimony to support a finding of these elements.
Petitioner received a full trial on her complaint.

Neither

the trial court nor the Respondent kept Petitioner from
admitting any evidence concerning the elements of trust,
contract or partnership.

In addition, Petitioner drafted

the findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the
trial court in this matter.
In viewing the circumstances of this case, assuming
that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner's motions, the trial court was within its
discretion to deny Petitioner's motion to supplement the
findings and decree and objection to dismissal, as
Petitioner failed to plead any alternate theories, and
failed to submit any evidence or testimony as to the
elements of any alternate theory.
IV.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR. CLARK'S ALLEGED
BAD FAITH IS WITHOUT MERIT AND IRRELEVANT.
Petitioner argues that some alleged bad faith on the

part of Mr. Clark should somehow entitle Petitioner to the
relief requested in Petitioner' s motions under equitable
principles.

Petitioner alleges that Mr. Clark caused delays

during the litigation which caused the Petitioner's failure
to file the findings and decree timely.
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This argument is

not based in fact or reason.
The parties and the trial court were all very aware of
the one-year time requirement of § 30-1-4.5, as noted above.
Any alleged delay which occurred prior to the trial date is
utterly irrelevant.

Trial was actually held leaving ample

time for Petitioner to submit the requisite findings and
order.

Petitioner carried the day at trial.

The trial

court ruled from the bench in her favor.3
The only delay which caused this matter to be dismissed
was Petitioner's delay.

Petitioner was in sole control over

when the documents would be prepared and submitted to the
court.

Trial was held on August 13, 1997.

Both parties and

the court knew that the documents had to be entered by
August 27, 1997.

The documents are not particularly complex

nor difficult to prepare, and could easily have been done by
the next day.

In spite of this, Petitioner did not submit

the documents to the court until September 26, 1997, nearly
an entire month after the deadline.

Neither the trial court

nor Mr. Clark were responsible for Petitioner's failure to
submit the documents timely.

3

This ruling is disputed by Mr. Clark in his related

appeal.
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Petitioner argues that, despite the trial court's
alleged knowledge of Mr. Clark's bad faith, "the trial court
refused to apply equitable principles and allow Plaintiff
the opportunity to obtain a fair distribution of jointly
acquired property/'

(Aplt. Brf. p. 20).

court did everything in its

power

In fact, the trial

to assure that the

Petitioner would have her day in court and be able to
present her case.

That the Petitioner failed to file the

documents timely was solely in

het power.

The trial court

lost subject matter jurisdiction and was forced to dismiss
the action.

Any prejudice to Petitioner in this matter was

self-inflicted.

The argument that the end result just

"isn't fair" carries no weight.
V.

PETITIONER FAILED TO ADEQUATELY RAISE ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.
"To assert constitutional claims on appeal, parties

must generally assert them first in the trial court."
Bunch, 906 P.2d at 921.

Petitioner did allude to certain

constitutional concerns in her Memorandum filed on June 3,
1998.

(R. 455).

In addition, Petitioner also mentioned the

possibility of constitutional issues at the hearing on the
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motion to dismiss.4

Neither in her memorandum in the lower

court nor at the hearing did Petitioner supply the trial
court with sufficient legal analysis to permit consideration
of weighty constitutional issues.
In Bunch, this Court refused to consider the
constitutional issues raised on appeal because:
"The closest Bunch came to making a constitutional
argument to the trial court occurred when the
trial court asked counsel whether the facts of the
case reflected any order that had timely
established a marital relationship. Counsel
responded that there was no order, but AI guess I
would have some concerns about the
constitutionality of such a statute when it would
make it - when a person files a Complaint to have
that determination made, and simply because of the
delays and court time and that sort of thing, it
can't get it to court.'" Id. at 921.
Here, as in Bunch, Petitioner only alluded to certain
constitutional concerns regarding possible equal protection
or "open courts" issues.

"There is no thoughtful or probing

analysis of a state constitutional question . . . ."

Id.

Petitioner failed to raise any constitutional claims at
the trial level to allow consideration in this Court.
"Nominally alluding to constitutional questions ^without any

4

"One other area that I did brief, I'll just touch on
briefly, and that is the Constitutional issues."
(Transcript from hearing, Aplt. Add. 6, p. 8 ) .
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analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise
the issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal.'"
Id.

(quoting State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App.

1989), rev'd

on other

grounds,

805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991)).

In addition, if Petitioner did attempt to contest the
validity of §30-1-4.5 at the trial level, Petitioner's
attempt must fail as she neglected to notify the Attorney
General of the action.

§78-33-11 states, in relevant part,

that "if a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged
to be invalid the attorney general shall

be served with a

copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard/'
(emphasis added).

This is mandatory language.

The

Petitioner failed to give any notice of any alleged
constitutional challenge to the Attorney General.
In Parker v. Rampton, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
the "propriety and essentiality" of including the Attorney
General as a party to an action contesting portions of Title
64 of the Utah Code.

497 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1972).

It is a general rule that where legislation is
assailed, the attorney general must be a party or
given notice thereof by the way of service of
pleadings upon him and where the proceeding is
lacking in this respect, a declaratory judgment
cannot be granted. Id. (quoting Anderson, Action
for Declaratory Judgment, Vol. 1, Section 179).
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This is the general consensus among other jurisdictions and
authorities.

See Torbin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361, 363 (Wy.

1975) (holding that the failure to notify the attorney
general about a challenge to the validity of a state statute
was "fatal to this appeal"); Lakewood Pawnbrokers, Inc. v.
City of Lakewood, 512 P.2d 1241 (Colo. 1973) (vacating a
lower court judgment finding a city ordinance in conflict
with a state statute on the basis that the attorney general
had not received notice of the proceeding); see also
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 275 (2nd ed., 1941)
(stating that "[i]n several cases in which the validity of a
state statute was either directly or indirectly involved,
the failure to make the state or Attorney General a party
was deemed fatal." (citations omitted)).
Therefore, because Petitioner failed to raise any
constitutional issues at the lower level adequately,
Petitioner is barred from raising said issues on appeal.

In

the alternative, Petitioner's failure to notify the Attorney
General at the trial level of a challenge to the validity of
§30-1-4.5 is fatal to any alleged challenge.
VI.

$30-1-4.5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioner argues that §30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code is
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unconstitutional.5

"The challenge to the constitutionality

of a statute presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness/'

Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1262

(Utah App. 1997) (citing Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159,
1162 (Utah 1996); Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d
423, 424 (Utah 1995)).

"[W]hen reviewing statutes for

constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and
V e resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 424
(quoting Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870
P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) ) .
"Moreover, we will not hold a statute to be
unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a
constitutional provision."

Campbell v. Campbellf

896 P.2d

635, 641 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Baker v. Matheson, 607
P.2d 233, 237 n. 2 (Utah 1979).

"We strive to construe

statutes so as to uphold them as consistent with both our
state constitution and the federal constitution."

5

Id.

Assuming that Petitioner is successful in her claim
that §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional, her appeal is moot,
since she relied exclusively on this provision to establish
a common law marriage at trial in this matter. If
Petitioner wins this argument, then her case must be
dismissed.
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(citing Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 934 n. 40).

Petitioner has

failed to establish that §30-1-4.5 clearly contravenes any
constitutional provision.
A.

§30-1-4.5 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares
that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due
course of law" for injury to "person, property, or
reputation."

§30-1-4.5 did not deprive the Petitioner any

access to legal redress in this case.

Petitioner filed her

complaint, performed discovery and other pre-trial matters,
and was afforded a timely and complete trial.
Petitioner cites the Berry case as analogous to the
present case.

In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670

(Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah determined that §7815-3 of the Utah Code Ann. violated the "open courts"
provision of the Utah Constitution because it operated to
bar actions without regard to when an injury occurred.
In contrast, §30-1-4.5 does not bar any action.

This

provision merely limits the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction to actions where an order establishing a common
law marriage has been entered within one year after the
termination of the relationship.
28

Therefore, no actions,

under §30-1-4.5, are barred on the basis of when an injury
occurred.
Petitioner argues that "[t]he right to apply to courts
for redress of wrong is a substantial right and application
of the one-year time limit to Plaintiff's case herein
violates her rights of due process and access
Courts/'

to the

(Aplt. Brf. p. 22). However, Petitioner was

actually afforded her right to apply to the appropriate
court in this matter for redress of any alleged wrong.

She

was duly afforded her rights of due process and access to
the courts.

Petitioner had the opportunity to bring her

complaint to trial and submit any evidence and testimony to
support her action.

§30-1-4.5 did not serve to deny

Petitioner her right, under the Utah Constitution, to access
to judicial redress.

Petitioner's own actions and omissions

caused the dismissal of her action.
B.

§30-1-4.5 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION
GUARANTEES OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution states
that v'[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation/'

The basic principle embodied in this language

is that "persons similarly situated should be treated
similarity, and persons in different circumstances should
29

not be treated as if their circumstances were the same/'
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
XN>

In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article

I, §24, we must determine whether the classification is
reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislation are
legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the classification and the legislative purposes.'"
Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)
(quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 637
(Utah 1989)). "The burden upon a plaintiff to demonstrate
unconstitutionality is a heavy one/'

Id.

(citing Blue

Cross, 779 P.2d at 637). Therefore, Petitioner must first
establish that §30-1-4.5 creates a classification scheme,
and then establish that the legislative intent behind the
classification is not reasonably related to a legitimate
legislative purpose.

Petitioner has failed to establish

that the provision even creates any classifications.
Petitioner argues that §30-1-4.5 creates "unreasonable
classifications" because "[o]ne group can obtain judicial
determination of their common law marriage within one year
and another year (sic) cannot obtain this determination."
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(Aplt. Brf. p. 23). However this is not an accurate
statement.

§30-1-4.5 allows all

petitioners to bring a

cause of action to establish a common law marriage.

No

classes are created by this provision on the basis of race,
property ownership, sex, legitimacy, age, duration of the
relationship, presence of children, or any other criteria.
Petitioner seems to argue that the provision creates
two classes: one class who has their common law marriage
established within the one-year time frame, and one class
which fails to meet the time requirement.

This theory would

allow any party who failed to comply with any statute of
limitation or repose, or any time requirement established by
the rules of civil, appellate or criminal procedure, to
claim that the statute or rule in question created
unreasonable classifications.

§30-1-4.5 does not create

this classification, and clearly does not when viewed in
light of the facts of this case.6

The statute simply puts a

time limit on the establishment of a common law marriage.

Perhaps in a theoretical case where a trial court
refuses to allow a litigant the opportunity to establish a
common law marriage within the one-year time frame, the
litigant may have an open courts or equal protection claim,
however, in the present case the trial court bent over
backwards to accommodate the requirements of the provision.
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All petitioners are treated exactly alike under this
provision.
The type of time requirement in §30-1-4.5 is analogous
to a statute of limitation or repose requirement.

In Lee v.

Gaufin, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations
provisions of §78-14-4(2) were unconstitutional under
Article 1, §24 of the Utah Constitution.
(Utah 1993).

867 P.2d 572, 575

The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[s]tatutes

of limitation are essentially procedural in nature and
establish a prescribed time within which an action must be
filed after it accrues/'

Id.

Further, statutes of

limitation "do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but
simply provide that if an action is not filed within the
specified time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived
unless the plaintiff did not know of the facts giving rise
to the cause of action."

Id.

(citations omitted).

"Thus,

the barring of the remedy is caused by plaintiff's failure
to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action
within the time afforded by the statute."
This is exactly the case at bar.

Id.

While the case before

the Court does not concern a statute of limitations, per
it does concern a similar time limitation.
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se,

Just as statutes

of limitation do not abolish any substantive right to sue,
neither does §30-1-4.5.

Petitioner was able to file her

complaint and have her day in court.

The dismissal of

Petitioner's action pursuant to the provision was caused
solely by Petitioner's "failure to take reasonable steps'" to
comply with §30-1-4.5.
In Bunch v. Englehorn, this Court declined to consider
any constitutional issues regarding the one-year limitation
of §30-1-4.5 because the issues were not adequately brought
up at the trial level.

906 P.2d at 921.

This Court

mentioned in Bunch that "the statute might present a
constitutional question in a different context . . . .

[I]f

a trial court were to enter a judgment denying a common-law
marriage within one year of separation, and that judgment
were reversed on appeal and the matter remanded, the parties
might be denied a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
plain meaning of the statute/7

Id. n. 3.

While this

specific fact situation may give rise to a constitutional
challenge, these facts, or any facts similar, are absent
from the present case.
Petitioner has failed to meet her burden to establish
that §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional in any way under the
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facts of this case.

Petitioner was afforded her right to

judicial redress for her claims.
day in court.

Petitioner received her

The provision did not unreasonably classify

the Petitioner.

She was treated just as all other litigants

bringing an action under §30-1-4.5 ought to be treated.
Petitioner won at trial.

Petitioner's action was dismissed,

not due to any unconstitutional operation of §30-1-4.5, but
only because of her own failure to submit the requisite
documents to the trial court in a timely fashion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal
of this action for lack subject matter jurisdiction.

In

addition, because the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, this Court should affirm the trial court's
denial of Petitioner's motions filed subsequent to the lack
of jurisdiction.

In the alternative, Respondent requests

that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of the
Petitioner's motions and objection because the trial court
was within its discretion in so ordering.
Respondent also requests that this Court determine that
the constitutional issues briefed in this appeal must fail
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because Petitioner failed to adequately raise any
constitutional issues at the trial level or failed to notify
the Attorney General of any legislative challenge.

In the

alternative, Respondent requests that this Court find that
§30-1-4.5 is constitutional as applied to the facts of this
case.
Respondent requests his costs incurred in this appeal
pursuant to Rule 34 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of AUGUST, 1999.
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ADDENDUM A
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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Art. VIE, § 5

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of ongmal
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2;
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to
those in this section were formerly found in
Art VIE, Sees. 7, 8 and 9

Cross-References. — Original and appellate jurisdiction, § 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appeal where case originated in circuit
court.
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain
appeals from distnet court decisions where the
case originated in a circuit court and involved
a constitutional issue, Supreme Court's jurisdiction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction
over appeals from a district court decision
where the case originated in a justice court, to
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a statute. State v Taylor, 664 P 2d 439
(Utah 1983).

ANALYSIS

In general
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
Appeal where case originated in circuit court.
Appeals.
City court supervision.
Defendant's right to appeal.
District court jurisdiction.
—Appellate.
—Original.
Divorce decree
Equity as distinguished from law case.
Extraordinary writs.
Final judgment.
Habeas corpus
Invoking jurisdiction.
Juvenile court supervision.
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers
Review in cases at law.
Review of evidence in equity cases.
Right to appeal
Summary appellate disposition.
Temporary restraining orders
Cited.
In general.
Although district courts of this state are
courts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdiction in all matters both civil and criminal
which are not excepted by law or the Constitution, one district court has no power to exercise
control over another Nielson v Schiller, 92
Utah 137, 66 P2d 365 (1937)
Appeal by the state in criminal cases.
This section does not grant the state a general right of appeal in criminal cases. State v
Kelbach, 569 P 2d 1100 (Utah 1977).

Appeals.
The district courts of this state had appellate
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of
decisions rendered by board of registration of
trades and professions revoking license of physicians. Baker v Department of Registration,
78 Utah 424, 3 P 2d 1082 (1931)
District judge who was called to another district to try a case did not have jurisdiction to
settle bill of exceptions in his home district.
Jenkins v Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P 2d 220
(1934)
Right to appeal is valuable and constitutional right and should not be demed except
where it is clear that right has been lost or
abandoned Adamson v Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P 2d 264 (1947)
City court supervision.
District court had subject matter jurisdiction
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecution; jurisdiction over the person was conferred
by accused's stipulation that case might be
transferred from city court to district court and
his appearance in latter court, fact that prosecution was initiated by complaint rather than
indictment or information did not preclude district court jurisdiction. Jardme v Hams, 63
Utah 560, 227 P 1029 (1924)
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